Ageing Depopulation

 

Among never ending speculations around immigrants, housing crisis, trade wars and global warming, often overlooked remains one specific topic, which soon will determine social and political landscape in each and every country.

Rapidly falling birth rates and ageing population.

 

Ageing is dying

When demographers say a population is ageing, they don’t mean that everyone is suddenly getting old — they mean that the average age of the population is increasing, and the proportion of elderly people (usually defined as age 65+) is growing relative to younger people.

This pattern comes mainly from two demographic trends:

1. Falling fertility rates — people are having fewer children.

In Japan, South Korea, Italy, and China fertility rates are well below the replacement level of 2.1 children per woman.

2. Rising life expectancy — People are living longer thanks to improved medical care and better living conditions.

Global life expectancy rose from ~52 years in 1960 to over 73 years in 2025.

Ageing rates are not even around the globe – Europe, East Asia, and North America are the most affected.

 

Median age

Let’s look at median age for some countries:

Country Median age
Japan 49.0
Italy 47.0
Germany 47.0
South Korea 45.5
Switzerland 44.5
China 40.0
USA 39.0

In Africa and parts of South Asia, on the contrary, the population is still very young – median age around 18–20. Which is not exactly a good situation.

Young population mainly means that a large amount of children are born. Still, 6–7% of all children in Africa die before age 5 and only 60-70% (in worst cases 44-55%) get to the age of 50. Compare with 98-99% in Europe.

⚠️ The median age is the age that divides a population into two equal halves:

50% of people are younger than this age, 50% are older.

A young median age (18-25) = fast-growing population, high fertility, short life expectancy.

An old median age (40-47) = slow-growing or shrinking population, low fertility, long life expectancy.

 

 

Something diabolical

The problem with “ageing” population is that it is a misleading term. Since it does not represent the actual social dynamics – decreasing amount of young people. Which directly causes decrease of birth rates.

Hence there is no issue with ageing population. There is an issue with population which is losing ability to reproduce itself.

Such population is not ageing – it is dying out.

 

Estonian example

Estonian situation illustrates this point very well:

Fertility rate: ~1.4 (well below replacement)
Median age: ~43 years (up from ~35 in 2000)
Population trend: Declining (and immigration cannot compensate it anymore)

Speaking statistically and politely, Estonia is ageing (the median age rises).

But demographically and realistically, it’s also dying out — the natural population growth is negative.

So it is fair to say:

“Estonian population is ageing because it is dying out.”

We could also say that population of Ukraine has aged pretty rapidly starting from 24.February.2022.

 

Why the term “ageing” persists

Demographers and policymakers often use “ageing” because:

a) It’s less politically charged than “dying out.”

b) It sounds natural and does not alert unnecessary anxiety.

c) It is true, though it’s a lie.

But the real demographic essense of ageing is low fertility and “too little young people”, not “too many old people.”


 

 

Always blame immigrants

For the last few decades, many developed countries in Europe and North America have compensated low fertility by accepting immigrants from countries with less stable economic situation and lower living standards.

This helped sustain labor forces, consumer markets, and tax bases even as native birth rates declined.

But, the party is over…

Fertility is falling nearly everywhere — and way faster than expected.

Here’s a snapshot of current and projected fertility rates (children per woman):

Region 1990 2025 2050 (UN projection)
Europe 1.8 1.5 1.6
East Asia 2.5 1.1 1.2
Latin America 3.0 1.7 1.5
South Asia 4.5 2.0 1.7
Africa 6.0 4.1 3.0

Even sub-Saharan Africa, long seen as the “last reservoir” of population growth, is rapidly declining in fertility.

Some countries like Kenya, Ethiopia, and Ghana are already near replacement levels in urban areas.

 

It just does not make any sense

So why anti-immigration sentiment grows even as depopulation worsens?

This is one of the biggest paradoxes of our time. Lets make some humble assumptions.

a. Timing mismatch

Depopulation is a slow structural process — it unfolds over decades.

Immigration, on the other hand, is a visible and immediate phenomenon.

Citizens feel the short-term social change (new languages, housing stress, cultural friction) far more vividly than the long-term fiscal and labor benefits.

So politicians exploit the visible tension (immigration) to deflect attention from the invisible cause (demographic contraction and weak demand).

b. Distributional effects

Immigration’s benefits are diffuse — GDP, tax revenue, service jobs; while costs are concentrated locally — competition for low-skill work, pressure on housing, social services.

That asymmetry breeds resentment, especially in regions that are already economically stagnant or losing native population.

c. Cultural self-preservation

In declining societies, identity anxiety rises.

When fertility falls below replacement, people subconsciously feel their group is “dying out.”

Immigration amplifies that fear — “we’re being replaced” — even though migrants are the only thing slowing the decline.

Estonia is the best example here.

d. Political incentive

Admitting that the economy is faltering because local population is shrinking sounds fatalistic and unsolvable.

Blaming immigration gives voters a tangible villain and gives politicians a short-term mobilisation tool.

So yes — anti-immigration politics is largely a psychological and symbolic response to the social disorientation caused by depopulation itself.


 

 

Sooner or later?

 

The “2080 peak” is probably overly optimistic

According to UN estimates, in the long run, humanity will likely peak around late-century (~2080, ~10.3 billion) and then begin shrinking. This model assumes automatic recovery of fertility rate after hitting its low point.

UN predicts that once development stabilises, fertility will “bounce back” slightly toward replacement (2.1) due to better gender equality, family policies, or cultural adaptation.

But empirically, that rebound has not happened anywhere yet:

South Korea: 0.65 and still falling.

Japan: 1.2 (down from 2.14 in 1973).

China: ~0.9 despite heavy pro-birth incentives.

Southern Europe: 1.1–1.2 for decades.

If we generalise those trajectories, a global decline will begin much sooner (possibly mid-century, not 2080).

 

The 1.6 is a modelling bias

The UN’s “medium variant” assumes a slow recovery to around 1.6–1.8 in low-fertility regions.

That’s not an observation; it’s a normative prior — effectively a policy optimism baked into the model.

UN demographers use a statistical technique that regresses fertility to the mean:

every country is assumed to converge toward replacement in the long run, regardless of cultural or economic evidence.

It’s an expectation of recovery, not a measurement of one.

 

Crude-birth-rate & life-expectancy ratio

Let’s apply some simple formula:

CBRreplacement = 1000 / LE

CBR – crude birth rate, number of live births in a year for every 1,000 people in a population.

LE – life expectancy in a given country

CBRreplacement – CBR needed to replace 1000 people during life expectancy period.

So if some country has a life expectancy of 80 years → 12.5 births per 1000 are needed for a stable population (ignoring migration).

Actual examples (2025 data):

Country CBRreplacement CBRactual
Japan 11.9 6.3
Germany 12.2 8.5
Switzerland 11.9 8.6
France 12.0 9.6
South Korea 12.0 4.8
China 12.4 7.5
USA 12.7 10.6
Estonia 12.7 8.9

 

All of these countries are below replacement by 30–60%.

The math alone implies structural decline even before any “bounce back” could possibly happen.

 

The snowball effect

Each generation’s smaller birth cohort means fewer potential parents next time around, even if fertility per woman stayed constant.

When the number of women of reproductive age shrinks, total births collapse faster than fertility rates suggest.

Once this dynamic dominates, the decline becomes non-linear — not a gentle slope, but a compounding contraction.

 

UN predicts 2080, math predicts 2040.

Global CBR in 2025: ~17 per 1000.

Global Life expectancy: ≈ 73 years → CBRreplacement ≈ 13.7 (still positive but shrinking fast).

Once global CBR hits ~12 (expected in 2040s at current slope), the world enters natural decline.

So official models are, frankly, politically damped — they encode optimism to avoid destabilizing narratives.

Institutions prefer a “manageable aging problem” to a “civilizational die-off problem.”


 

 

Global Economic Depression

Most mainstream discussions of population decline focus on labor shortages and fiscal strain.

But there’s another side: shrinking demand.

The problem with population decline is that it shrinks markets first of all. Which reduces need for production, which reduces need for labour force.

So as a matter of fact we can face unemployment growth. Which will eventually lead to political instability.

 

1. The paradox of Supply and Demand in a shrinking society

Demographic decline reduces both:

  • the supply of labor, and
  • the demand for goods and services.

Most economists emphasize the supply side (“we’ll have too few workers”), but the point is that demand will eventually fall faster than supply, leading to overproduction and unemployment, even with fewer people.

If population shrinks, the total market contracts → less consumers → fewer goods sold, fewer services provided, less infrastructure needed.

Businesses cut investment, production, and hiring.

So even though in theory labor supply falls, in practice firms might need even fewer workers.

That can easily lead to technological unemployment and demand-deficient recessions — especially in advanced economies that already have high productivity.

 

2. Why “labor shortage” and “unemployment” can coexist

This is subtle but true, since we can have:

Labor shortages in specific sectors (e.g. healthcare, logistics, skilled trades),

Surplus labor in others (retail, manufacturing, youth jobs, creative sectors).

That mismatch creates structural unemployment — people available to work, but not with the right skills or in the right regions.

So, paradoxically:

Demographic decline + automation + weak demand = fewer people but higher unemployment.

 

3. Feedback loop between demography and economics

Entire point can be summarized as:

Demographic decline → smaller markets → shrinking demand → lower employment → weaker household formation → lower birth rate → further demographic decline.

This is the economic snowball that mirrors the demographic snowball – they literally reinforce each other.

 

4. Inner vs. outer migration — a demographic sorting process

All keymarks are already visible.

a. Inner migration (rural → urban)

As small-town economies collapse (shops, schools, hospitals closing), people move to where jobs cluster — usually the capital or one or two big cities.

This drains regional human capital, accelerates local decline, and inflates housing costs in the cities.

In Estonia’s case: Tallinn consolidates the national economy, while much of Ida-Viru, Võru, or Valga lose population rapidly.

In Japan: Tokyo vs. countryside.

In Italy: Milan vs. the South.

b. Outer migration (weak → strong regions)

Between countries: from shrinking, low-income regions (Baltics, Balkans, Eastern Europe) to slower-shrinking, higher-income cores (Germany, Nordics).

This stabilizes the core but hollows out the periphery, making future recovery even harder.

c. Outcome: Demographic polarization

Fewer but denser economic centers.

Vast peripheries of “demographic deserts.”

Infrastructure and political power concentrate around shrinking megacities — almost neo-feudal in structure.

As the result, sustained depopulation can breed a crisis of legitimacy.

How governments will respond to this remains an open question answer to which depends on local conditions.

 

And then it all collapses

The likely tipping sequence

Stage 1 – Fiscal exhaustion

Governments spend more on pensions, healthcare, and subsidies while revenue stagnates.

Public debt rises, and bond markets start doubting repayment capacity.

Governments respond with austerity or inflationary money creation.

Stage 2 – Welfare retrenchment

Cuts to healthcare, pensions, and local services hit aging populations directly.

This triggers localized protests and political radicalization.

Younger cohorts feel abandoned and leave — accelerating depopulation.

Stage 3 – Regional collapse

Smaller towns lose economic viability:

  • Population leaves,
  • Schools close,
  • Local governments can’t maintain infrastructure,
  • Businesses migrate to core urban centers.

We already see early signs in rural Italy, Greece, Japan, and Baltics.

When population density falls below a threshold (~30–40 people/km²), service collapse becomes self-reinforcing — demographic desert.

Stage 4 – Institutional fatigue

Civil service, health system, and education sectors lose manpower faster, than they can recruit.

At this stage, “efficiency reforms” can’t compensate anymore — systems simply downsize.

Stage 5 – Political extremism

As demographic decline deepens, the declared democratic values lose their credibility. Citizens no longer perceive state institutions as legitimate or effective; the rule of law becomes hollow, applied selectively or manipulatively.

In such an environment, social cohesion erodes. Groups and individuals increasingly act from survival instinct rather than civic principle.

Competition for political influence, material resources, and security grows ruthless and dehumanized.

 

Legitimacy erosion spiral.

What is already happening and will only gain further momentum.

Demographic contraction → fewer workers, smaller tax base, rising dependency ratios.

Institutional strain → governments can no longer deliver previous levels of debt based welfare or stability.

Public disillusionment → citizens lose trust in elections, courts, and public services.

Fragmentation of society → identity groups (ethnic, regional, economic) retreat into self-interest networks.

Moral corrosion → legality loses its moral foundation; corruption becomes normalized.

Political predation → power becomes the only currency that still guarantees survival or privilege.

At that stage, “democracy” may still exist formally — elections, parties, parliaments — but it functions as a ritual without faith, an echo of a past order that no longer commands loyalty.

 

The final question

It is not the question how to prevent the collapse.

It is imminent and all nations will go through it in one way or another.

The only question is how nations will manage their fall and who will be still able to stand up.


 

Idea and fundamental concept: Ragnar Sepp

Data research: Artificial Analyser

Organising software: ByCycle